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ment before appealing, however, a favorable ruling would be purely academic. 4
To avoid such harsh consequences arising from various types of rulings, both Congress and the Supreme Court have carved out exceptions to
this “final decision rule.” 5 The collateral order doctrine is the most prevalent of these exceptions, and it interprets certain interlocutory orders as
“final” for purposes of appeal. 6 These orders generally must conclusively
determine an issue that is distinct from the merits of the central claim, and
that would be mooted post-judgment. 7
Over time, the Supreme Court has both broadened and narrowed each
of these requirements for collaterally appealable orders, and the resulting
complexity of the doctrinal framework has made consistent application
difficult for lower courts. 8 Consequently, there has been a drastic increase
in purely procedural litigation. 9 As these cases have risen to the federal
courts of appeals, various circuits have reached divergent conclusions on
whether to grant appellate jurisdiction for several classes of rulings. Currently, the federal circuits are split regarding whether collateral order appeal is appropriate for denials of appointed counsel in civil rights cases,
denials of Parker immunity claims, temporary reinstatement orders for
miners pursuing claims against their employers, and resolutions of motions
to strike under anti-SLAPP statutes. 10
In response to concerns over increasing caseloads in the federal courts,
Congress commissioned a Federal Courts Study Committee to research the
issue in 1988. 11 The Committee Report cited both the final decision rule
and the collateral order doctrine as “unsatisfactory” because litigants remained unclear on when an order was appealable. 12 To remedy this, the
Committee recommended that Congress grant the Court rulemaking authority to define both when a ruling is final for purposes of appeal and when
otherwise non-final rulings are appealable. 13 Congress complied and grant4. See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (allowing immediate appeal from denials of
motions to reduce bail).
5. ALEX KOZINSKI & JOHN K. RABIEJ, FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE MANUAL 19–37
(2014).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 19–20.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. Federal Courts Study Comm., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee 95 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
12. Report, supra note 9, at 95.
13. Id. at 95–96.
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ed the Court this authority soon after, but the Court has used these powers
only once. 14
To address the increased litigation and inconsistent applications by
lower courts, the Court should again use its rulemaking authority granted to
it by Congress—authority that allows the Court to re-articulate requirements for collateral order appeal and eliminate the various interpretations
courts employ. With respect to important, previously appealable classes of
orders excluded by the new requirements for collateral order finality, the
Court can codify appellate jurisdiction deliberately.
Part II of this Comment discusses the final decision rule and its most
common exception: the collateral order doctrine. It traces the Supreme
Court’s individual development and treatment of each of the doctrine’s
requirements, and identifies presently conflicting interpretations. It also
discusses Congress’ grant of rulemaking authority to the Court to address
difficulties arising from the collateral order doctrine. Part III highlights
current circuit splits surrounding the doctrine, and subsequently analyzes
how various federal courts of appeals have applied the requirements differently. Part IV proposes a two-step solution: first, the Court should use its
authority to narrowly redefine the collateral order doctrine’s three requirements for finality; second, the Court should complement these new requirements by providing for immediate appeal of certain non-final rulings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Final Decision Rule
The U.S. Supreme Court and various federal courts of appeals generally have jurisdiction to review final decisions of lower courts. 15 A final
decision, alternatively called a final judgment, is one that fully resolves all
claims against all parties to the lawsuit, adjudicates all issues on the merits,
and leaves only the execution of the judgment to be completed by the lower
court. 16 This prerequisite for appellate review is aptly referred to as the
“final judgment rule,” or “final decision rule.” The rule furthers several
important policies, such as emphasizing deference to the authority and
independent judgment of the lower court; avoiding the obstruction of meri14. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2007)
(Discussing codification of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) in 1990, allowing judicial rulemaking to define when a
ruling is final for purposes of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; also discussing codification of 28
U.S.C. § 1292(e) in 1992, allowing for rulemaking to provide appeal for otherwise non-final rulings,
and the Court’s sole use of this authority to promulgate FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f)).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2011).
16. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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torious claims arising from the harassment and cost of successive, piecemeal appeals; and promoting efficient judicial administration. 17
Postponement of appeal promotes efficiency because it guards against
review of an issue that may be rendered moot by a trial on the merits. In
addition, the eventual trial may raise additional federal questions that are
resolved more quickly when consolidated into a single appeal. Thus, postjudgment appeals generally save time and money for both litigants and the
court system. 18
On the other hand, parties unhappy with a court’s decision made during litigation must sometimes wait for a long time before they may appeal.
By then, it may be too late for an appellate court to restore important rights
a lower court wrongfully denied. For example, a litigant confronted with an
order rejecting an asserted privilege may be forced to expose private communications before receiving an opportunity to appeal that ruling.19 Such
disclosures— erroneously compelled by the court for use at a public trial—
may result in serious personal or professional harm. In this regard, the costs
of postponing appeal sometimes outweigh the benefits.
To address this issue, both Congress and the courts have carved out
various exceptions to the final decision rule where undue harshness would
otherwise result. Legislative exceptions include certain interlocutory orders
subject to appeal either as of right or by discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292, such as rulings on injunction or difficult questions of law where substantial ground for difference of opinion exists. 20 Judicially-crafted exceptions include grants or denials of class-action certification pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority, 21 writs of mandamus for extraordinary circumstances such as judicial usurpation of power, 22 and the collateral order doctrine. 23
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine
Established by Cohen in 1949, the collateral order doctrine allows for
appeal from a narrow category of interlocutory judgments that do not fully

17. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
18. Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 423, 428 (2013).
19. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009).
20. Kozinski & Rabiej, supra note 5, at 37; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, FED. R.
CIV. P. 54(b).
21. Kozinski & Rabiej, supra note 5, at 37.
22. Id. at 22–23.
23. Id. at 19.
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resolve an action. 24 The plaintiff in Cohen brought a stockholder’s derivative action against the corporation and several of its managers and directors. 25 The defendants moved to apply a state law holding unsuccessful
plaintiffs in such cases liable for costs and requiring them to post a bond as
security before proceeding on the action. 26 The district court denied the
motion and the defendants immediately appealed. 27 After reversal in the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari partly on the issue
of whether the order was immediately appealable. 28
Citing its history of giving the final decision rule a “practical rather
than a technical construction,” the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 permitted immediate appeal for three principal reasons. 29 First, although the cause
of action had not been decided, this order represented final disposition of
the security issue. 30 Second, the order was separable from the merits of the
case—that is, it did not advance any aspect of the central claim, required its
own distinct analysis, and would not be merged in final judgment. 31 Third,
by the time a reviewing court could resolve the issue on appeal, the lower
court would have already forced the plaintiff to post the money as a precondition to the suit, and the issue would therefore be moot. 32
In the years that followed, the Court failed to offer specific requirements for the Cohen doctrine, and instead granted jurisdiction where it
found an order to be “too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred.” 33
Almost thirty years later, the Court finally took this vague standard and
articulated three discrete elements for collateral orders which remain in use
today in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 34
The Coopers & Lybrand Court held that decisions excepted from the
final decision rule must: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 35 The Court has long held, however, that when applying this test,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949).
Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 544–45.
See id. at 545.
Id.
Id. at 546–47.
Id.
Id. at 546.
See Id.
Lammon, supra note 18, at 448 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1978).
Id. at 468.
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courts must determine whether the type of order at issue generally meets
these requirements in all cases rather than just in the case at hand. 36 For
example, a denial of a motion to certify a case as a class action may be
conclusively determined in a particular case, but immediate appealability of
this type of order is inappropriate because courts often revisit the class
certification issue as the litigation proceeds. This policy against individualized jurisdictional inquiry promotes efficiency by allowing higher courts to
establish appellate jurisdiction over entire classes of orders rather than deciding each case on the merits. 37
Predictably, the federal circuits have routinely disagreed about proper
application of each of these three prongs 38 because the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the doctrine’s requirements has gradually evolved since
Cohen. 39 So, to illustrate why lower courts have applied the doctrine inconsistently, this section will trace each prong’s development and treatment
individually.
1. Conclusiveness
In Cohen, the Supreme Court crafted the collateral order doctrine from
its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statutory source of authority for
the final decision rule. 40 The Court determined that Congress did not intend
the statute to apply only to decisions that terminate an action. 41 Rather, the
Cohen Court interpreted the statute to allow for appeal of any final ruling,
and it found certain interlocutory decisions final so long as they were not
tentative, informal, incomplete, open, unfinished, or inconclusive. 42
This interpretation ostensibly instructed that rulings subject to later
modification are not ripe for appeal under the statute. When the Court articulated discrete requirements for collateral order appeals in Coopers &
Lybrand, it offered similar guidance. In that case, the Court found the conclusiveness requirement not satisfied with respect to a denial of class certification because the order was subject to alteration or amendment before
the decision on the merits. 43

36. E.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (“In fashioning a rule of appealability under § 1291, however, we look to categories of cases, not to particular injustices.”).
37. Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 231–32 (7th Cir. 1988).
38. See discussion infra part III.
39. See discussion infra part II.B.1–3.
40. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 546.
43. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469 n.11.
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under the conclusiveness prong, but the Court’s guidance in those cases
merely supplemented that of its previous cases. Accordingly, lower courts
may reasonably decide whether an order is conclusive based on several
considerations, including whether the entering court expects to revise the
order later, whether subsequent revision remains possible, 52 and even
whether revision is probable. 53 Perhaps one of these considerations should
be dispositive or at least weigh more heavily than the others, but this remains unclear.
2. Separability
In its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Cohen Court held that
even fully consummated decisions could not be immediately appealed if
they were “but steps toward final judgment in which they will merge.” 54
The Court required that rulings be sufficiently separable from the central
merits of the case to prevent successive, piecemeal appeals by combining
“all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results.” 55
In the two and a half decades immediately following Cohen, separability questions presented little trouble for the Court. 56 For example, the Court
in Stack v. Boyle found denial of a motion to reduce bail in a criminal case
sufficiently distinct from the merits of the central charge. 57 The Stack Court
provided little explanation for its grant of jurisdiction in this context, but a
court can certainly resolve the issue of whether bail should be reduced in a
case without any examination of the underlying criminal charge. In addition, resolution of the bail issue does not advance the underlying action
toward final judgment.
In 1977, a pair of cases revealed the most debated issue surrounding
separability: whether any overlap with the merits of the case is permissible.
The first case, Abney v. United States, involved an order rejecting a double
jeopardy claim. 58 After being tried and convicted, an appellate court vacated the defendants’ convictions. On remand, the defendants moved to dis-

52. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
55. Id.
56. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951);
Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 688–89 (1950); Roberts v. United States District Court,
339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950).
57. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 6.
58. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
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miss to avoid facing two trials for a single offense. 59 In reviewing appellate
jurisdiction over the denial of their motion, the Court determined that the
defendants’ double jeopardy claim was separable from the central issue of
guilt or innocence in the case because the defendants neither challenged the
merits of the criminal charge nor sought to suppress the related evidence
against them. 60
Double jeopardy claims, however, often overlap with the merits. 61 As
mentioned above, when the court confers appellate jurisdiction, it does so
for the entire classes of orders. Thus, Abney weakened the requirement that
the issue be completely separate from the merits of the action, at least for
certain claims.
That same year, the Court decided National Socialist Party of America
v. Skokie. 62 In that case, the state court entered an injunction preventing a
Nazi group from marching or otherwise displaying the swastika in public. 63
Both the Illinois appellate court and Supreme Court denied the Nazis’ subsequent motions to stay the injunction. 64 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and found the denial of stay immediately appealable as a collateral order. 65
The Court reasoned that the Nazis would potentially be deprived of
First Amendment rights while waiting more than a year for appellate review to complete, and the state must provide strict procedural safeguards
when seeking to impose such restrictions, including access to immediate
appeal. 66 Here again, the Court diluted Cohen’s strict separability requirement when it held that the issue is sufficiently separable despite immediate
review being predicated upon a showing that the underlying First Amendment claim is facially valid. 67
Less than a decade later, the Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth gutted the
separability requirement. 68 The order at issue in that case was a denial of a

59. Id. at 655.
60. Id. at 659–60.
61. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four
Proposals for Reform, 46 Drake L. Rev. 539, 548–551, 557 (1998) (“For example, if the issue is whether the same conduct is the basis of both prosecutions, there may be a need to determine, based upon
evidence presented at trial, precisely the conduct in which the defendant engaged.”).
62. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 43–44.
65. Id. at 44.
66. Id.
67. Anderson, supra note 61, at 559.
68. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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government official’s assertion of qualified immunity. 69 The applicable
legal analysis called for a court to determine whether the defendant’s alleged conduct violated clearly established legal norms. 70 This issue appeared inextricably entangled with the merits (whether his actual conduct
violated the law).
Nevertheless, the Court sidestepped the obstacle of separability by redefining it to require only that the issue be “conceptually distinct.” 71 The
Mitchell Court rationalized that such overlap was acceptable because decisions on other classes of immediately appealable orders, like double jeopardy claims, may also require consideration of the facts of the central
claim. 72 Thus, Mitchell indicated that separability was satisfied so long as
the issue on appeal had an identifiable difference from the merits. 73
Three years later, the Court reverted to a “completely separate” standard in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard. 74 There, the Court considered whether
denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens
should be appealable as a collateral order. 75 In a drastic change of position
on separability, the Court stated that “[a]llowing appeals from interlocutory
orders that involve considerations enmeshed in the merits of the dispute
would waste judicial resources by requiring repetitive appellate review of
substantive questions in the case.” 76
For example, one factor courts must examine when determining
whether venue is appropriate under that doctrine is the ease of access to
sources of proof. To assess this factor, a court must “scrutinize the substance of the dispute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required,
and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant, to the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any potential
defenses to the action.” 77 Thus, this analysis necessarily involves some
inquiry into the facts and legal issues of the case and cannot be adequately
separated from the merits. 78

69. Id. at 515.
70. Id. at 517.
71. See id. at 527–28.
72. Id. at 528 (“To be sure, the resolution of these legal issues will entail consideration of the
factual allegations that make up the plaintiff’s claim for relief; the same is true, however, when a court
must consider whether a prosecution is barred by a claim of former jeopardy . . . “).
73. Anderson, supra note 61, at 574.
74. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527–28 (1988).
75. Id. at 527.
76. Id. at 527–28.
77. Id. at 529.
78. Id.
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After Van Cauwenberghe, the Court’s only notable review of separability was in Johnson v. Jones. 79 But in that case, the Court simply declined
to find a particular determination in a lower court’s denial of summary
judgment separable from the merits, and did not further refine the requirement. 80 In sum, the Court’s guidance thus far indicates that considerations
necessary to determine collaterally appealable orders may overlap with
those necessary to determine the merits of the case, but only in certain situations. Again, the Court has not provided clear guidance on when a lower
court must require complete separability rather than mere conceptual distinctness.
3. Importance
In addition to separability, the second prong in Coopers & Lybrand
specified that an issue must be important. Nevertheless, the Court has often
considered this requirement as part of the unreviewability prong and has
even suggested it as an independent, dispositive consideration. 81 Accordingly, a brief discussion of importance as a distinct element is warranted.
Although the Cohen opinion defined the small class of collaterally appealable orders as those “too important to be denied review,” 82 courts did
not initially require that a ruling involve a sufficiently important right. Almost forty years after Cohen, Justice Scalia first suggested implementation
of the importance standard as a further limiting principle of the Court’s
greatly expanded finality jurisprudence in his 1988 concurrence in Gulfstream. 83 Five years later, the Court bolstered its reasoning for allowing the
collateral order appeal of a denial of an Eleventh Amendment immunity
claim by stating that the “ultimate justification” was the importance of the
interests protected. 84
The next year, the Court in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. suggested for the first time that importance alone may be a dispositive consideration. 85 In that case, the plaintiffs argued that the lower
court’s rescission of their settlement agreement should be immediately
appealable because it provided immunity from trial. 86 The Court disagreed,
finding that—in contrast to a constitutional or statutory right to evade tri79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
See id. at 310–315.
See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878–79 (1994).
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 291–92 (1988).
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
Id. at 866–67.
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DO²´ VXFK D ULJKW E\ DJUHHPHQW GRHV QRW ULVH WR WKH OHYHO RI LPSRUWDQFH
QHHGHGIRUUHFRJQLWLRQXQGHU´
$GGLQJ WR WKH FRQIXVLRQ WKH Digital Equipment &RXUW DOVR DFNQRZO
HGJHGWKDWZKHWKHULPSRUWDQFHLVDVHSDUDWHIDFWRULVDYDOLGTXHVWLRQDQG
HPSKDVL]HGWKDWLPSRUWDQFHLVDQDSSURSULDWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUeachRIWKH
GRFWULQH¶V SURQJV 7KH &RXUW UHIHUUHG WR LWV SULRU LQVWUXFWLRQ WR FRQVLGHU
LPSRUWDQFH LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH VHFRQG SURQJ EXW DOVR VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH
WKLUGSURQJVLPSO\FDQQRWEHDQVZHUHGZLWKRXWDMXGJPHQWDERXWWKHYDOXH
RI WKH LQWHUHVWV WKDW ZRXOG EH ORVW WKURXJK ULJRURXV DSSOLFDWLRQ RI D ILQDO
MXGJPHQWUHTXLUHPHQW´
1RQHWKHOHVV WKH &RXUW KDV IDLOHG WR RIIHU VWDQGDUGV IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ
ZKHWKHU DQ LQWHUHVW LV VXIILFLHQWO\ LPSRUWDQW 2QH FRPPHQWDWRU KDV VXJ
JHVWHG WKDW WKLV LQTXLU\ RQO\ EHFRPHV GLVSRVLWLYH ZKHQ DOO Coopers &
Lybrand IDFWRUV DUH VDWLVILHG EXW WKH &RXUW EHOLHYHV JUDQWLQJ DSSHOODWH MX
ULVGLFWLRQ ZRXOG FDXVH WRR PDQ\ SUDFWLFDO SUREOHPV <HW LQ SUDFWLFH
FRXUWV VRPHWLPHV IRUHJR WKH LQTXLU\ DOWRJHWKHU DQG VRPHWLPHV WKH\ DW
WHPSWWRPHDVXUHLPSRUWDQFHE\FRPSDULQJDQLQWHUHVWZLWKWKRVHSUHYLRXV
O\KHOGVXIILFLHQW
8QUHYLHZDELOLW\
7KHGRFWULQH¶VILQDOHOHPHQWWKDWGHOD\RIDSSHDOXQWLOILQDOMXGJPHQW
SUHFOXGHVHIIHFWLYHUHYLHZRIWKHLVVXHKDVKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQERWKWKHPRVW
GHEDWHG DQG PRVW PDOOHDEOH 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V PDQLSXODWLRQ RI WKLV
PRRWQHVVUHTXLUHPHQWKDVSULPDULO\GULYHQERWKWKHGRFWULQH¶VH[SDQVLRQ
DU\ SHULRG IURP  WR ²ZKLFK OHG WR D GUDVWLF LQFUHDVH LQ OLWLJD
WLRQ² DQG LWV VXEVHTXHQW QDUURZLQJ WKURXJK WKH SUHVHQW <HW IURP LWV
GHFLVLRQ LQ Cohen XQWLO  WKH &RXUW DSSHDUHG WR PDLQWDLQ D QDUURZ
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interpretation, and extended collateral order appeals only where delay
would render post-judgment review impossible. 94
In Local No. 438 Const. & Gen. Laborers’ Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry,
the Court began its expansion of the requirement. The Court allowedimmediate appeal of an order issuing a temporary injunction to stop union picket
lines from forming in front of an employer. 95 The issue on appeal was
whether the state court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction, or whether
that jurisdiction rested with the National Labor Relations Board. 96 This
marked a significant departure from the Court’s previous decisions because
here, postponement of appeal would not completely moot the issue of jurisdiction. 97 Instead, the Court grounded its decision on the fact that delay
would have negative national labor policy implications. 98 Curry thus signaled a change from Cohen’s strict mootness requirement to allow for an
alternative: broader policy considerations.
Where the Court in Curry created an alternative to the requirement of
strict unreviewability, the Court seemingly dropped the third prong entirely
a decade later. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, a district court ordered the
defendants to pay most of the cost of providing notice to potential members
of a class action. 99 Most notably, the Supreme Court held that the notice
cost ruling was immediately appealable as a collateral order but said nothing about loss of effective review after a final decision. 100 The Court’s silence here was striking because defendants could have appealed the issue
after prevailing on the merits and could have obtained an order for reimbursement from the plaintiffs. 101 Commentators have suggested this indi-

94. See generally, Anderson, supra note 61, at 548–51. See also, Parr v. United States, 351 U.S.
513 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950);
Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
95. Local No. 438 Const. & Gen. Laborers’ Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
96. Id. at 548.
97. Anderson, supra note 61, at 552 (“In Curry . . . if the defendants had been required to wait
until a permanent injunction was granted, the issue whether the NLRB had jurisdiction to the exclusion
of state courts would not have been moot; if the United States Supreme Court were to rule on appeal
that the state courts lacked jurisdiction, the injunction would be vacated and the union would be free to
resume picketing.”).
98. Curry, 371 U.S. at 550 (“The policy of 28 U.S.C. s 1257 against fragmenting and prolonging
litigation and against piecemeal reviews of state court judgments does not prohibit our holding the
decision of the Georgia Supreme Court to be a final judgment, particularly when postponing review
would seriously erode the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents’ cause to be
heard by the National Labor Relations Board, not by the state courts.”).
99. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1974). See also, Anderson, supra note
61, at 551–53.
100. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 172.
101. Anderson, supra note 61, at 555.
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cated that the third element was unnecessary and that conclusiveness and
separability alone were sufficient. 102
After several years, the Court reaffirmed the three elements of the collateral order doctrine in Abney, but it restated the unreviewability prong. 103
This revision required only that a ruling involve “an important right which
would be ‘lost, probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final judgment.” 104 In contrast to Cohen’s standard that delay must prevent any review at all, this rephrasing appeared to permit appeal where delay would
damage some important rights, even though review remained possible.
In Abney, that important right was a right not to be tried. As mentioned above, the lower court in that case rejected the defendants’ double
jeopardy claim. 105 The Supreme Court reasoned that the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent “the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense.” 106 If convicted, the issue would not be completely moot because the
defendants could then appeal and possibly have the convictions overturned,
but they would have lost the very right that the clause was designed to protect. 107
This change dramatically increased the pool of orders potentially appealable as collateral orders. Perhaps aware of this, the Court quickly doubled back in two cases that soon followed. In U.S. v. MacDonald, the
defendant moved to dismiss an indictment for murder charges on the
grounds of denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 108 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, the petitioner sought review of an
order denying disqualification of opposing counsel for a conflict of interest. 109 In both cases, the Court found that the petitioners would still have an
opportunity for meaningful review because the issues could be reviewed
after trial and judgment could be vacated if prejudicial error was found. 110
In these cases, the Court indicated that the burden of defending litigation, by itself, is not a sufficiently important right to justify immediate appeal. A right not to be tried is sufficient only when it is central to the claim

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
Id. at 658 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 850 (1978).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369 (1981).
Id. at 377–78; see MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 860–61.
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denied by the order, as it was with the double jeopardy clause in Abney. 111
As the MacDonald Court described speedy trial claims, “it is the delay
before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee . . . .” 112 Likewise, orders refusing to disqualify counsel offend no
similar right to evade trial. 113
In Mitchell, expansion of the doctrine reached its apex when the Court
added qualified immunity claims to the list of immediately appealable collateral orders. 114 In that case, Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a
warrantless wiretap while investigating a domestic national security
threat. 115 The wiretap recorded three conversations involving Keith Forsyth, who then sued Mitchell for money damages after an unrelated but
timely decision ruled such wiretaps illegal. Mitchell asserted partly that
qualified immunity entitled him to immunity from suit. 116
The Mitchell Court reasoned that like assertions of double jeopardy,
the issue could be reviewed after final judgment, but an essential purpose
of the qualified immunity defense is to guard officials from the litigation
itself. 117 The Court explained that qualified immunity is more than just a
shield from liability; its purpose is to allow government officials to reasonably make decisions and take action “with independence and without fear
of consequences.” 118 Those consequences included subjecting officials to
the costs and distractions of litigation. 119 With this reasoning, the Court
reaffirmed its position that immediate appeal is appropriate where rights
central to the claim are jeopardized, even though review and eventual reversal is possible after final decision.
Initiating the doctrine’s retrenchment era, the Court changed course
two years later and denied immediate appeal despite its conclusion that
important rights would be irretrievably lost in Stringfellow v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action. 120 The petitioners in Stringfellow sought to intervene
in litigation brought by both state and federal government involving haz-

111. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861 (“Unlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the Speedy Trial Clause does not, either on its face or according to the decisions of this Court, encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.”).
112. Id.
113. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376.
114. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
115. Id. at 513.
116. Id. at 515–16.
117. Id. at 525–26.
118. Id. at 525 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)).
119. Id. at 525–26.
120. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
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ardous waste disposal near their homes. 121 The district court denied the
petitioners intervention as of right, but granted them permissive intervention subject to several restrictive conditions, including disallowance of
damage claims. 122 The petitioners argued that any appeal of their denial to
intervene as of right would be futile after a final decision because an appellate court would almost certainly decline to invalidate such a complex case
“involving numerous parties and years of litigation.” 123
The Stringfellow Court found this contention plausible, but irrelevant. 124 It explained that any litigant faced with an adverse pre-trial order
faces the same practical difficulties, and those difficulties do not justify
further erosion of the final decision rule. 125 Perhaps the Court intended to
reserve the collateral order doctrine for instances where important rights
are certain to be lost, rather than just overwhelmingly probable, yet the
Court failed to distinguish the right to intervene from other rights where
immediate appeal is allowed.
In two cases over the following two years, the Court further narrowed
the doctrine’s mootness requirement by chipping away at the “right not to
be tried” standard for immediate appeal used in Abney and Mitchell. In the
first case, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, Justice Marshall alluded to the
Courts reason for changing course. 126 He explained that any litigant with a
meritorious pretrial claim for dismissal can reasonably assert that such
claim entails a right not to stand trial. 127 If it were to tolerate this, the Court
would eviscerate the final decision rule because litigants can typically assert some ground for dismissal in any case. 128
Both cases appeared immediately appealable under the more expansive Mitchell analysis. The petitioner in Van Cauwenberghe argued that his
immunity from service of process as an extradited citizen encompassed a
right not to be tried, like the Court held with qualified immunity in Mitchell. 129 The petitioner in the second case, Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser,
argued that its forum selection clause comprised a contractual right not to
be tried, at least not in a jurisdiction other than the Italian tribunal specified

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988).
Id.
Anderson, supra note 61, at 579.
Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522–23; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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in the clause. 130 The Court’s own precedent supported both petitioners’
contentions that their respective claims conferred a right not to stand trial. 131
Nevertheless, the Court held denial orders to be not immediately appealable in both situations. In Van Cauwenberghe, the Court concluded that
the purpose of immunity from service of process in the case’s context was
to ensure that the “receiving state does not abuse the extradition processes
of the extraditing state,” not to protect the extradited person from the burdens of trial. 132 In Lauro Lines, the Court drew a distinction between a right
not to be tried at all and a right not to be tried in a particular forum. 133 Both
results seemed unlikely, given both the recent Mitchell decision and precedent indicating a right to avoid trial as central to these specific issues.
Over the next two decades, the Court continued to gradually condense
the collateral order doctrine. Its most recent decision in Mohawk Indus.,
Inc. v. Carpenter represents the Supreme Court’s narrowest stance on the
doctrine since its genesis in Cohen. 134 In Mohawk, the petitioner sought
immediate appeal of the trial court’s denial of his privilege claim and ordered that he disclose attorney-client communications. 135 In recognition of
the seriousness of its ruling, the trial court issued a stay so that the petitioner could explore possible avenues to appeal, including the collateral order
doctrine. 136
In its analysis of whether effective review would be possible after trial, the Court regressed from its standard that an important right must be
injured or lost. Rather, the Court assessed whether the interest was so imperiled by delay that it justified allowing immediate appeal for the entire
class of orders—an analysis which would mean undermining both administrative efficiency and the independence and authority of district court judges. 137
On one hand, the Court recognized the importance of the attorneyclient privilege and its purpose of encouraging candor between clients and
130. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 500 (1989).
131. Anderson, supra note 61, at 578 (explaining that the Court’s leading precedent on the issue at
that time held that an extradited foreign citizen’s immunity from service conferred “the right to be tried
only for the offense upon which extradition was based, and no others”); Id. at 584–85 (explaining that
the Court’s leading precedent supported the argument that forum selection clauses confer a contractual
right not to stand trial that would be destroyed by postponement until after trial).
132. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 525.
133. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501.
134. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 100 (2009).
135. Id. at 104–05.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 107; 108–09.
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counsel. On the other, litigants faced with adverse pre-trial privilege rulings
have several remedial options, such as post-judgment appeal with the possibility of receiving a new trial with an order to exclude privileged material
from evidence, a petition to the appeals court for a writ of mandamus, or
defiance of the order followed by appeal of either the sanctions or the contempt ruling. 138 Because it found these alternatives sufficient, the Court
concluded that the benefits of allowing collateral order appeal did not justify the institutional burdens. 139
As with the doctrine’s other requirements, the Court’s guidance regarding unreviewability has, with each subsequent case, accumulated into a
complicated and confusing morass. Post-Mohawk, the requirement remains
satisfied where post-judgment appeal is indeed moot. If appeal is not mooted, the requirement is nonetheless satisfied where delay compromises an
important right, such as a right not to stand trial. Even where an important
right will be lost post-judgment, the requirement is not satisfied if the institutional costs of expanding the doctrine are not justified.
Mohawk was also significant because the Court suggested a preference
for using its authority under the Rules Enabling Act—rather than by judicial decision—to expand the class of collaterally appealable orders. 140 In
fact, Justice Thomas opined in his concurrence that this preference for
rulemaking should be the Court’s holding rather than dicta. 141
C. Rulemaking as an Alternative
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 142 the Supreme Court has
long had the authority to promulgate rules of procedure. 143 The final decision rule, however, is federal law, 144 and although the Court may interpret a
federal statute—as it did in Cohen—it generally cannot make formal alterations or amendments. Therefore, the Court previously could not extend
appellate jurisdiction beyond what Congress had previously authorized. But
in 1990, the congressionally commissioned Federal Courts Study Committee filed a report recommending that Congress grant the Court such power. 145
138. Id. at 109–11.
139. Id. at 112.
140. Id. at 114.
141. Id. at 118–19 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)).
143. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2011).
145. Report, supra note 9.
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WKHVH FRXUWV KDYH DSSOLHG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V ZDQGHULQJ JXLGDQFH RXW
OLQHGDERYH
A. Denials of Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases
Pro se OLWLJDQWV SURVHFXWLQJ FDVHV LQ IHGHUDO FRXUW PD\ SHWLWLRQ WKDW
FRXUWIRUDSSRLQWHGFRXQVHOLIWKH\DUHILQDQFLDOO\XQDEOHWRUHWDLQFRXQVHO
LQGHSHQGHQWO\$OWKRXJKWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWJXDUDQWHHVDSSRLQWHGFRXQ
VHO WR LQGLJHQW GHIHQGDQWV LQ FULPLQDO FDVHV WKHUH LV QR VXFK JXDUDQWHH
IRU pro se OLWLJDQWV EULQJLQJ FLYLO ODZVXLWV 7KH WULDO FRXUWV KDYH GLVFUH
WLRQRYHUWKHVHDSSRLQWPHQWVDQGWKH\FRQVLGHUIDFWRUVVXFKDVWKHPHU
LWV DQG FRPSOH[LW\ RI WKH SODLQWLII¶V FDVH WKH SODLQWLII¶V DELOLW\ WR SD\
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)LUVW FRXUWV WKDW IRXQG FRQFOXVLYHQHVV QRW VDWLVILHG GHGXFHG VR EH
FDXVH ODWHU UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH RUGHU UHPDLQHG possible 7KRVH WKDW

  *LGHRQY:DLQZULJKW86±  
  /DVVLWHUY'HS¶WRI6RF6HUYV86±   SUHVXPLQJWKDWLQGLJHQWOLWLJDQWV
RQO\KDYHDULJKWWRDSSRLQWHGFRXQVHOZKHQWKHLUXQVXFFHVVIXOOLWLJDWLRQWKUHDWHQVSHUVRQDOIUHHGRP 
  See86& H    
  See, e.g. )LFNHQY$OYDUH])G± '&&LU +ROWY)RUG)G
 WK&LU 
  See generally %UDG')HOGPDQ&RPPHQWAn Appeal for Immediate Appealability: Applying
the Collateral Order Doctrine to Orders Denying Appointed Counsel in Civil Rights Cases  *HR
/-  1LQHFLUFXLWVKDYHGLVDOORZHGLPPHGLDWHDSSHDORIRUGHUVGHQ\LQJWKHDSSRLQW
PHQWRIFRXQVHO)LFNHQY$OYDUH])G '&&LU +ROWY)RUG)G
 WK&LU 0LOOHUY6LPPRQV)G WK&LU +HQU\Y&LW\RI'HWURLW
0DQSRZHU'HS¶W)G WK&LU 6PLWK%H\Y3HWVRFN)G G&LU
 $SSOHE\Y0HDFKXP)G VW&LU 5DQGOHY9LFWRU:HOGLQJ6XSSO\&R
 )G   WK &LU   &RWQHU Y 0DVRQ  )G  ± WK &LU  
0LOOHU Y 3OHDVXUH  )G  ± G &LU   7KUHH FLUFXLWV KDYH DOORZHG LPPHGLDWH
DSSHDORIVXFKRUGHUV/DULVFH\Y86)G )HG&LU 5REELQVY0DJJLR
)G WK&LU 6ODXJKWHUY&LW\RI0DSOHZRRG)G WK&LU 7KH
QLQWKFLUFXLWKDVPDGHLPPHGLDWHDSSHDORIWKHVHRUGHUVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHW\SHRIFODLPSUHVHQWHGSee
:LOERUQY(VFDOGHURQ)G WK&LU id.$WQ
  SeeFDVHVFLWHGsupraQRWH1RWDEO\WKHUHLVDSHWLWLRQWRWKH866XSUHPH&RXUWIRUD
ZULWRIFHUWLRUDULFXUUHQWO\SHQGLQJLQWKH'&&LUFXLWRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIFROODWHUDORUGHUDSSHDOIURP
GHQLDOVRIDPRWLRQWRDSSRLQWFRXQVHOLQFLYLOFDVHVSee 3HWLWLRQIRUD:ULWRI&HUWLRUDUL6DLY7UDQVS
6HF$GPLQ)6XSSG ''& DSSHDOGLVPLVVHG -XQH  1R 
  )HOGPDQsupraQRWHDWsee also, e.g.0LOOHUY6LPPRQV)G WK
&LU  'HFOLQLQJWRFRQVLGHUGHQLDORIPRWLRQIRUDSSRLQWPHQWRIFRXQVHODVFRQFOXVLYHO\GHWHUPLQ

2017]

THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE

639

found the orders conclusive, on the other hand, offered little explanation as
to why; the Fifth Circuit noted only that “if a defendant after denial of the
motion chooses to go forward with his claim, he must do so without the
assistance of appointed counsel.” 160 Perhaps these courts, like the Fifth
Circuit, reached this conclusion because denial of appointed counsel so
often causes litigants to abandon their claims or settle prematurely, and
thus, subsequent review of these rulings is unlikely. 161
Second, courts that found separability unsatisfied argued that these orders typically require consideration of the merits and complexity of the
claim. 162 In contrast, the Federal Circuit reasoned that such a determination
is neither a step toward final judgment on the merits, nor does it “enmesh”
the court in such issues (despite the denial of counsel potentially affecting
the litigant’s ability to proceed on his claim). 163 For this requirement, courts
have generally agreed that consideration of the merits is necessary to dispose of the order, but have diverged on whether this is significant.
Third, a majority of circuits have concluded that the issue remains reviewable after final judgment. 164 These courts argued for a stricter, mootness-based interpretation, and commonly analogized to both Flanagan v.
United States and Firestone. 165 In both cases, the Supreme Court considered collateral order appeal of rulings on the disqualification of counsel and
found post-judgment review remained effective because the remedy of a
new trial is sufficient, which is available upon a successful appeal of an
erroneous denial order. 166
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits, however, found that delay
would impose intolerable burdens upon plaintiffs, because it would likely
strip civil pro se litigants of their ability to both effectively prosecute their
claim and successfully appeal their denial of appointed counsel. 167 As the
Federal Circuit noted, so long as the petitioner’s case was presented reasonably, an appellate court is unlikely to find denial of counsel prejudicial,
ing the issue because the magistrate denied the motion without prejudice and therefore could later
reconsider).
160. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 412–13 (“Indeed, there remains a great risk that a civil rights plaintiff may abandon a
claim or accept an unreasonable settlement in light of his own perceived inability to proceed with the
merits of his case, resulting in the loss of vital civil rights claims.”).
162. E.g., Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989).
163. Lariscey v. U. S., 861 F.2d 1267, 1269–71 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
164. See supra note 157.
165. E.g., Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853–54 (11th Cir. 1989).
166. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266–67 (1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377–78 (1981).
167. See Lariscey v. U.S., 861 F.2d 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d
405, 413 (5th Cir. 1985); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984).
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and “may never know whether a different or better case could have been
presented that would have turned the tide in the indigent litigant’s favor.” 168
B. Denials of Parker Immunity
The circuits also diverge on whether immediate appeal is appropriate
for denials of a defendant’s motion to dismiss that asserts state action immunity in antitrust litigation, also called Parker immunity. In Parker v.
Brown, the Supreme Court held that Sherman Antitrust Act prohibitions on
anticompetitive activities do not apply to the conduct of a state or its
agents. 169
For example, both parties in Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency,
LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC operated individual apartment complexes near the University of Colorado. 170 Plaintiff Auraria Student Housing at the Regency (Auraria) claimed that Defendant Campus Village
Apartments (Campus Village) illegally conspired to monopolize student
housing in violation of Sherman Act prohibitions through its agreement
with the university. 171 This agreement required that most students reside in
the Campus Village apartments for their first two semesters of enrollment. 172
Campus Village moved to dismiss and argued that the agreement was
not subject to Sherman Act prohibitions because it was authorized, or at
least a foreseeable result, of both state legislation and a clear state policy to
displace competition with those regulations. 173 The district court disagreed
and denied Campus Village’s motion. 174 Campus Village immediately appealed, but the Tenth Circuit declined jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine. 175
The federal circuits are currently split on the issues of whether the denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by both private parties
such as Campus Village and state actors. 176 The split regarding private
168. Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1270.
169. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
170. Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 F.3d 1147
(10th Cir. 2013).
171. Id. at 1149.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1149–50.
175. Id.; Id. at 1153.
176. See generally, Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity and the Collateral
Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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SDUWLHVKRZHYHULVPXFKOHVVSURQRXQFHGHVSHFLDOO\DIWHUWKHGHFLVLRQLQ
Auraria 2QO\ WKH (OHYHQWK &LUFXLW KDV DOORZHG LQWHUORFXWRU\ UHYLHZ LQ
VXFKFDVHV
&XUUHQWO\VHYHQIHGHUDOFRXUWVRIDSSHDOVKDYHDGGUHVVHGWKHLPPHGL
DWH DSSHDODELOLW\ RI GHQLDOV RI Parker LPPXQLW\ FODLPV 7KH )RXUWK &LUFXLW
KHOGWKDWGHQLDOVRIParkerLPPXQLW\LQPRWLRQVWRGLVPLVVDUHQRWLPPHGL
DWHO\ DSSHDODEOH ZKLOH DV QRWHG DERYH WKH (OHYHQWK &LUFXLW KHOG WKDW
WKH\DUH7KH)LIWK&LUFXLWDOORZVLQWHUORFXWRU\UHYLHZEXWRQO\IRUJRY
HUQPHQWDO GHIHQGDQWV /LNHZLVH WKH 6L[WK DQG 7HQWK &LUFXLWV GLVDOORZ
DSSHDOV IURP SULYDWH SDUW\ GHIHQGDQWV WKRXJK WKH\ KDYH QRW FRQVLGHUHG
WKH TXHVWLRQ DV LW UHODWHV WR VWDWH DFWRUV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH 7KLUG DQG 6HYHQWK
&LUFXLWV KDYH \HW WR RIIHU ELQGLQJ SUHFHGHQW RQ WKH PDWWHU EXW KDYH VXJ
JHVWHGLQGLFWDWKDWWKH\ZRXOGVLGHZLWKWKH)LIWK&LUFXLWDQGILQGLPPHGL
DWHDSSHDODSSURSULDWHIRUVWDWHDFWRUGHIHQGDQWV
$OORIWKHIHGHUDOFLUFXLWVPHQWLRQHGDERYHDJUHHGWKDWGHQLDOV RIParker LPPXQLW\ FRQFOXVLYHO\ GHWHUPLQH WKH LVVXH $ UXOLQJ RQ LPPXQLW\
DV DVVHUWHG LQ D PRWLRQ WR GLVPLVV LV QRW D WHQWDWLYH RU LQIRUPDO RUGHU DQG
ZLOODOPRVW FHUWDLQO\ QRW EH VXEMHFW WR UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ $QG HYHQ FRXUWV
WKDW GHFOLQHG LPPHGLDWH UHYLHZ DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW IRU JRYHUQPHQWDO
GHIHQGDQWV WKHVH RUGHUV SUHVHQW LVVXHV VHSDUDEOH IURP WKH PHULWV RI WKH
DFWLRQ
3UD[DLU,QFY)ORULGD3RZHU /LJKW&R)G WK&LU 
JUDQWLQJFROODWHUDORUGHUDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQRIDSSHDOVIURPGHQLDORIVWDWHDFWLRQLPPXQLW\IURP
DQWLWUXVWOLDELOLW\ 
 See6&6WDWH%GRI'HQWLVWU\Y)7&)G WK&LU 
 Praxair)GDW
 See 0DUWLQ Y 0HP¶O +RVS DW *XOISRUW  )G   WK &LU  FRQFOXGLQJ
DVVHUWLRQRIVWDWHDFWLRQGRFWULQHE\SXEOLFKRVSLWDOGHIHQGDQWLPPHGLDWHO\DSSHDODEOH $FRXVWLF6\V
,QFY:HQJHU&RUS)G WK&LU  ILQGLQJDVVHUWLRQRIVWDWHDFWLRQGRFWULQHE\
SULYDWHSDUW\GHIHQGDQWHIIHFWLYHO\UHYLHZDEOHDIWHUWULDODQGWKXVQRWLPPHGLDWHO\DSSHDODEOH 
 $XUDULD 6WXGHQW +RXV DW WKH 5HJHQF\ //& Y &DPSXV 9LOO $SDUWPHQWV //&  )G
 WK&LU +XURQ9DOOH\+RVS,QFY&LW\RI3RQWLDF)G WK&LU
 
 :H ,QFY&LW\ RI3KLODGHOSKLD)G G&LU  $JUHHLQJZLWK6HYHQWK
&LUFXLWGHFLVLRQWKDWWKHVWDWHDFWLRQ GRFWULQHLPPXQL]HVVWDWHRIILFLDOVIURPEXUGHQVRIOLWLJDWLRQDQG
WKDWWKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQFDVHVLQYROYLQJSXEOLFRIILFLDOVDQGWKRVHLQYROYLQJSULYDWHSDUWLHV 
6HJQL Y &RPPHUFLDO 2IILFH RI 6SDLQ  )G   WK &LU   H[SODLQLQJ WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQDVVHUWLRQRILPPXQLW\E\DSXEOLFRIILFLDODQGE\DSULYDWHSDUW\DQGFLWLQJFRXUWVWKDWIRXQG
LPPXQLW\RISXEOLFRIILFLDOVLVLQWHQGHGWRVKLHOGIURPEXUGHQVRIWULDO 
 See, e.g.6&6WDWH%GRI'HQWLVWU\)GDW GHQ\LQJLPPHGLDWHDSSHDOEXWVWDWLQJ
WKDW³WKHUHLVQRGLVSXWHWKDWWKHGHQLDORIParkerSURWHFWLRQVDWLVILHVWKHILUVWFROODWHUDORUGHUUHTXLUH
PHQW´ 
 .RUQPHKOsupraQRWHDW±
 Id.DWsee, e.g.6&6WDWH%GRI'HQWLVWU\Y)7&)G± WK&LU
³7R EH VXUH WKH 3DUNHU DQDO\VLV GRHV QRW DOZD\V UHTXLUH DQ LQTXLU\ LQWR ZKHWKHU WKH VWDWH DFWHG WR
GLVSODFH FRPSHWLWLRQ WKH LSVR IDFWR H[HPSWLRQ >LPPXQLW\ IRU JRYHUQPHQW HQWLWLHV SDUW RI WKH VWDWH@
WXUQVRQO\RQWKHLGHQWLW\RIWKHGHIHQGDQW´ 

642

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:2

A court does not need to examine whether an antitrust violation occurred to
determine whether a government entity that is part of the state qualifies for
immunity from such claims. Thus, courts have generally agreed that these
orders satisfy the first two elements of the Coopers & Lybrand test.
For the third prong, the threshold question is whether a denial of Parker immunity confers a “right not to be tried.” 186 As discussed above, a
party entitled to avoid the costs and burdens of litigation cannot adequately
vindicate that right after the litigation has concluded. Thus, courts that
found this element satisfied have held that Parker immunity indeed provides immunity from trial. 187
In contrast, courts that have disallowed collateral order appeal because
of this element have found that Parker immunity is merely a defense to
liability. 188 For this class of orders, the split regarding unreviewability is
unique in that the courts agree about the proper application of the Coopers
& Lybrand test. If Parker immunity confers a right to evade trial, immediate appeal is appropriate. Rather, the issue is whether this immunity confers
that right.
C. Temporary Reinstatement Orders for Miners Bringing Claims Under the Mine Safety and Health Act
More recently in 2014, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals split from
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, and from a later decision by the D.C.
Circuit in 2016, with its decision in Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine
Safety & Health Review Comm’n. 189 In that case, Respondent Russel Ratliff
alleged that Petitioner Cobra Natural Resources, LLC unlawfully retaliated
and fired him from his job as a coal miner after he voiced safety concerns
regarding mining operations. 190 An administrative law judge determined
that Ratliff was entitled to temporary reinstatement to work while his claim

186. Kornmehl, supra note 176, at 14; Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287, 292 (5th
Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen we assess whether interlocutory review is appropriate, ‘[t]he critical question . . . is
whether the essence of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial.’ “ (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988)).
187. E.g., Martin v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391, 1395 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We conclude
that Parker v. Brown state action immunity shares the essential element of absolute, qualified and
Eleventh Amendment immunities—’an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances.’”
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)).
188. See, e.g., S. Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 445–47 (4th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting arguments that state action antitrust doctrine provides immunity from suit).
189. Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82 (4th
Cir. 2014).
190. See id. at 83–84.
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was pending and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
(“FMSHRC”) affirmed that determination. 191
If Cobra waited until the court entered final judgment to appeal the reinstatement order, the issue would be entirely moot. Cobra would be unable
to recover the wages and benefits Ratliff earned during that period even if
the appeals court found reversible error. At that point, the mine operator
must sustain both the economic loss and any damage from personnel issues
arising from its employment of an unwelcome worker. Cobra thus sought
interlocutory review of the FMSHRC order under the collateral order doctrine. 192 The Fourth Circuit declined appellate jurisdiction, finding none of
the Coopers and Lybrand Factors satisfied. 193
The Fourth Circuit held that the reinstatement ruling was not a conclusive determination because a mine operator can seek modification of the
order based on “a change of circumstances,” such as a major layoff or mine
shutdown. 194 Alternatively, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits both reasoned
that the order was conclusive because the mine operator was left with no
further recourse to avoid the Commission’s order at the agency level. 195
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit argued that there was no basis to suspect that
the commission contemplated reconsideration of the order. 196 The Seventh
Circuit found such an order conclusive as well, but offered no explanation. 197
In terms of separability, the Fourth Circuit found that the question presented by a review of the order would not be sufficiently distinct from the
merits of the case. 198 To obtain temporary reinstatement, the worker must
demonstrate that his claim is “non-frivolous” by showing “protected activity, adverse action, and a nexus between the two.” 199 The court reasoned
that the factual and legal considerations of the discrimination claim were
“deeply enmeshed” with initial considerations necessary to determine
whether the claim was non-frivolous. 200
191. Id. at 85.
192. Id. at 83.
193. See id. at 88–92.
194. Id. at 89.
195. CalPortland Co., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n on Behalf of Pappas,
No. 16-1094, 2016 WL 6123899, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2016); Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738, 744 (11th Cir. 1990).
196. CalPortland, 2016 WL 6123899, at *4.
197. Vulcan Const. Materials, L.P. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 700 F.3d 297,
300 (7th Cir. 2012).
198. Cobra, 742 F.3d. at 90.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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In contrast, the D.C., Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found the issues
separable, but for different reasons. For the Seventh Circuit case, the ruling
at issue was not a grant of reinstatement; rather, it was a denial of a motion
to dissolve an existing reinstatement. 201 As such, the determinative issue on
appeal was that of statutory interpretation rather than one of whether the
miner sufficiently presented prima facie evidence of discrimination. 202
Accordingly, the issue was clearly separable from the merits of the discrimination claim. 203 The Eleventh Circuit found separability because the factual and legal considerations involved were “conceptually distinct” from the
merits. 204 Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit found conclusiveness because the
reinstatement order resolved no issue necessary for determination of the
merits. 205
For the last element, the Fourth Circuit concurred with the Seventh,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits that a mine operator such as Cobra would indeed lose any opportunity for recovery if forced to delay its appeal until
after final judgment, but it concluded that Cobra’s losses were not sufficiently important. 206 The court determined that the financial concerns at
stake in the case, being “primarily economic,” failed to approach the importance of other orders the Supreme Court found insufficient in this regard. 207
D. Orders Disposing of Special Motions to Strike under Anti-SLAPP
Statutes
The most recent federal circuit split addressing collateral order appeals
emerged in early 2016 with the Second Circuit’s decision in Ernst v. Carrigan. 208 In that case, the Second Circuit declined to follow previous rulings
regarding immediate appealability of resolutions of motions to strike under
the various anti-SLAPP statutes by both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 209
SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. 210 Anti-SLAPP statutes provide for early dismissal of meritless law201. Vulcan, 700 F.3d at 299.
202. Id. at 300.
203. See id.
204. Jim Walter Res., 920 F.2d at 744.
205. CalPortland, 2016 WL 6123899, at *5.
206. Cobra Natural Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 91–92
(4th Cir. 2014).
207. Id. at 92.
208. Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2016).
209. Id. at 120-21.
210. Id. at 117.
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suits filed primarily to suppress the exercise of valid political expression by
burdening the defendant with costly, time-consuming litigation. 211 In Ernst,
the applicable Vermont anti-SLAPP statute provides for dismissal where
defendants can show that the case arises from their “exercise of ‘the right to
freedom of speech or to petition the government’ [sic] and that the speech
or petition is ‘in connection with a public issue.” 212 If successful in this
showing, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show both that the defendant’s
conduct at issue lacked either reasonable factual support or any arguable
basis in law, and that such conduct caused them actual injury. 213
The conduct at issue in Ernst was the defendants’ alleged writing and
circulation of a letter regarding their neighbors with whom they had engaged in multiple zoning disputes, Barbara Ernst and Barbara Supeno.214
The letter contained information supposedly showing that Ms. Ernst and
Ms. Supeno routinely falsified information, used harassment, lied, distorted
facts, and used the court system for extortion. 215 The defendants also allegedly made defamatory statements during a public meeting and sent a letter
to Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno’s lawyer that implied the plaintiffs would not
pay him for his services. 216
In response, Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno sued in state court alleging
defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference
against the defendants. 217 After successfully removing the case to federal
court, the defendants filed special motions to strike the claims against them
under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute. 218 The district court granted the motions to strike two of the allegations and denied the motions for the remaining two. 219 The district court declined to certify the opinion for
interlocutory appeal, and both parties cross-appealed. 220
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined to grant appellate jurisdiction because the orders at issue failed to satisfy the separability requirement of the collateral order doctrine. 221 The court determined that the antiSLAPP statute’s requisite examinations of both whether the defendant’s

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 119.
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conduct had factual support or basis in law, and whether the conduct
caused injury, were intertwined with the merits of the action. 222
For example, the court explained that to decide the anti-SLAPP motion, the district court had to examine the parties’ filings and accompanying
affidavits to determine whether the alleged statements were “devoid of
reasonable factual support.” 223 Similarly, the court must find that the statements were false for Ms. Ernst and Ms. Supeno to be successful on the
merits of their defamation claim. 224 The court found these two inquiries to
be neither “completely separate” nor “conceptually distinct.” 225 In contrast,
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits found them separable primarily because a court
must satisfy a lower standard to resolve an anti-SLAPP motion than it does
to resolve the claim, namely, whether the plaintiff’s claim merely has merit, not whether it will succeed. 226
The Second Circuit also dismissed the argument that failure to satisfy
the separability prong should not preclude the immediate review of antiSLAPP statutes because they provide an immunity from trial. 227 The court
explained that although denials of a claim of an immunity from trial, such
as a qualified immunity claim, can be immediately appealed “even though
part of the traditional inquiry touches on the merits,” such overlap must
involve only the determination of a question of law. 228 Even in the qualified
immunity context, a fact-related dispute is not immediately appealable. 229
Similarly, anti-SLAPP determinations turn on a fact-based inquiry regarding the factual support of the alleged conduct, and therefore the court
found them not truly separable from the claim. 230 Thus, the Second Circuit
concluded that even if the anti-SLAPP statute did provide a substantive
immunity from trial as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits found, 231 resolutions of
these motions should not be immediately appealable. 232

222. Id. at 119-20.
223. Id. at 120.
224. Id.
225. See Id. at 120-21.
226. Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2009); Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003).
227. Ernst, 814 F.3d at 121.
228. Id. at 121-22.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 122.
231. Henry, 566 F.3d at 177; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1025.
232. Ernst, 814 F.3d at 121-22.
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IV. REDEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLATERAL ORDER
APPEAL
The collateral order doctrine has become one of the most complex and
unpredictable issues in civil procedure. As outlined above, the Supreme
Court has expanded and contracted the Cohen interpretation of § 1291 finality over the years, and has left a trail of confusing, and, at times, contradictory guidance. These decisions have led to a patchwork of inconsistent
outcomes in the lower courts. This section proposes a two-step solution:
first, the Court should use its authority to redefine § 1291 finality using a
strict, narrow interpretation of Cohen’s requirements; second, the Court
should use its § 1292(e) authority to provide for appeal of non-final rulings
as a safety valve, where policy interests favor immediate appeal.
Professor Lloyd C. Anderson argued that one potential remedy would
be for the Court to use its rulemaking authority to create a rule authorizing
appeal as of right from prejudgment orders only where it: “(1) conclusively
determines an issue; (2) the issue is completely separate from the merits;
and (3) the order would be unreviewable at all after final judgment because
the issue would be moot.” 233 He noted that during the doctrine’s initial era,
when these requirements were strictly construed, the Supreme Court needed to review collateral order issues only once every six years. 234 In contrast,
the Court reviewed the issue once for every year during its expansionary
era from 1974 to 1988. 235 As Anderson argues, this is evidently a result of
the Court’s “own loosening of jurisdictional standards.” 236
Redefining the requirements for collateral orders in these terms would
provide further limitations that keep the doctrine “narrow, and selective in
its membership,” as the Court has repeatedly advocated. 237 It would also
preserve appellate jurisdiction for several classes of orders already deemed
eligible and maintains the collateral order framework for future classes of
orders. Further development is necessary, however, for each of these requirements.
First, Anderson failed to address the difficulties courts have had determining whether an order is conclusive. The revised definition of finality
should clarify that a conclusive order is one where the adversely affected
litigant can take no further steps to avoid the effects of the order. As the
233. Anderson, supra note 61, at 607.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 581.
236. Id.
237. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546
U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).
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DQLQGLJHQWOLWLJDQWKLVIUHHGRPRUWKHDELOLW\WRSXUVXHKLVFODLP

  0RVHV+&RQH0HP¶O+RVSY0HUFXU\&RQVW&RUS 86 
  &RKHQY%HQHILFLDO,QGXV/RDQ&RUS86  
  9DQ&DXZHQEHUJKHY%LDUG86  
  See, e.g.6WDFNY%R\OH86   RUGHURQPRWLRQIRUUHGXFWLRQRIEDLO 
  See, e.g.Cohen86DW± H[WHQGLQJDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQIRULPPHGLDWHUHYLHZ
RIUXOLQJVRQZKHWKHUWRFRPSHODSODLQWLIIWRSRVWVHFXULW\EHIRUHSURFHHGLQJZLWKFODLP 
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Fourth, strict unreviewability should require that delayed review be
impossible because the issue is mooted. Where review remains possible,
this requirement would not be satisfied, even where a litigant suffers some
cost or loses some attendant rights upon delay. For example, an order denying a police officer’s qualified immunity defense would remain reviewable
even though he could never vindicate his right to evade trial. This is because he would still be able to assert the immunity as a defense to liability
on appeal, and if vindicated, the judgment could be overturned.
A rule that incorporates these requirements would look something like
this: Final decisions for purposes of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
include interlocutory decisions that 1) leave no further steps the litigant can
take to vindicate the claim of right before final judgment; 2) resolve no
issue that must be determined to dispose of the litigation; and 3) are mooted
post-judgment. This revised definition resolves current ambiguities and
provides clear rules for lower courts to apply, but it would overrule many
classes of orders previously held appealable as of right.
For policy reasons, some of these newly excluded classes of orders
should be immediately appealable. In these instances, Anderson suggested
that litigants seek discretionary appeal under § 1292(b) or file a mandamus
action under § 1361. 243 Although these options remain viable, both can be
exceedingly difficult paths for litigants seeking an appeal. 244 A better approach would be for the Court to again use its § 1292(e) authority to provide a codified path for appeal of those non-final rulings.
The class of orders that would most benefit from this type of rulemaking are denials of governmental immunity claims. This proposed definition
would overrule entire lines of such cases, including those that allowed for
immediate appeal from rejections of a president’s claim of absolute immunity, 245 a government official’s claim of qualified immunity, 246 and a

243. Anderson, supra note 61, at 608.
244. Tory Weigand, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First
Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183 (2014) (“There is a concern that
[1292(b)] is under-utilized, unduly limited to ‘exceptional case[s]’ or to large complex cases, and
otherwise hobbled by allowing trial judges, with unreviewable discretion and ‘vested interests,’ to serve
as gatekeepers of appellate review.”); Anderson, supra note 61, at 543 (“Mandamus actions, however,
are limited to exceptional circumstances in which a district court has exceeded the scope of its authority
or has so manifestly abused its discretion that it has, in effect, ignored the rules.”).
245. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (permitting immediate appeal from denial of U.S.
President’s claim of absolute immunity).
246. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 536 (1985) (permitting immediate appeal from denial of
Attorney General’s claim of qualified immunity).
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state actor’s claim of Parker immunity. 247 These immunities, and the protections they provide from litigation, further important interests as the court
has repeatedly recognized. 248 To preserve these interests, the Court should
promulgate a rule providing for appeal as of right from denials of governmentally asserted immunities.
Going forward, this new framework for collateral order appeals would
resolve the remaining circuit splits without the need for individual review.
For denials of appointed counsel in civil cases, the new requirements would
overrule the three circuits that allow immediate appeal because these orders
would remain reviewable after final judgment. Indeed, this may prove
harsh for litigants in civil rights cases as some commentators and judges
have noted, especially where important statutory or constitutional rights are
at stake. 249 Cases such as these, however, also present instances where important policy interests could motivate the Court to use its § 1292(e) rulemaking authority to carve a path for appeal.
In contrast, orders granting temporary reinstatement of miners bringing complaints against their employers would fall into the narrow category
of orders appealable under the doctrine. The orders satisfy the conclusiveness requirement because there are no further steps the mine operator can
take to avoid reinstatement. Although the orders may be revised due to a
change in circumstances, those circumstances lie outside the mine operator’s control. As noted, every federal circuit to consider the issue agreed
that it would also be moot post-judgment. 250
The remaining requirement, separability, is satisfied for these orders
as well. As discussed above, a miner must demonstrate that his claim was
non-frivolous to obtain temporary reinstatement. 251 To do so, he must provide evidence of protected activity, adverse action, and a nexus between the
two, 252 elements he must also prove to succeed on the merits. But the miner
must satisfy a lower standard for purposes of the reinstatement order: that

247. E.g., Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 611 (11th Cir. 1995) (permitting immediate appeal from denial of electric utility company’s claim of Parker immunity from antitrust liability).
248. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (“[W]here an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’”).
249. See Feldman, supra note 157, at 1740.
250. See supra note 206–207 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
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his claim is merely non-frivolous. 253 In doing so, the Commission resolves
no issue that needs to be determined to prevail on the merits. Accordingly,
the Commission’s determination makes no step toward final judgment, and
immediate appeal does not risk duplicative review.
Similarly, this framework confirms separability for resolutions of antiSLAPP motions to strike because the fact-based inquiry required involves a
lower standard. Again, these statutes require a court to confirm that the
claim is non-frivolous by examining whether challenged conduct is devoid
of reasonable factual support or whether the plaintiff can establish a probability of success for his claim. 254 Neither of these requirements, however, is
sufficient to succeed on the merits, which requires, for example, a determination that challenged assertions are indeed false. 255 Thus, such preliminary
inquiries fail to resolve any issue that is central to the claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The collateral order exception to the final judgment rule functions
most efficiently as a narrow mechanism with requirements that, when satisfied, adequately balance the institutional burdens of increased appellate
caseloads with the benefits of mitigating unduly harsh consequences for
litigants. The U.S. Supreme Court has, however, gradually stretched these
requirements, albeit often to further important policy interests. In doing so,
the Court has left complex and confusing guidance that has made interpretation difficult and has significantly increased procedural litigation. A revised definition of finality that both returns to a narrow interpretation of
Cohen’s requirements and resolves potential ambiguities, alongside further
Supreme Court rulemaking, would return Cohen’s collateral order doctrine
to a workable standard, resolve current conflicts, and avoid the institutional
costs of addressing the issue through fragmentary litigation.

253. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 90 (4th
Cir. 2014) (explaining that an analysis of an application for temporary reinstatement involves a more
lenient standard than that which the litigant must undertake following a full hearing on the merits).
254. E.g., Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2016); Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press,
L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 2009).
255. E.g., Ernst, 814 F.3d at 120.

